Debugging complex software systems is a major problem. Proving properties of software systems can be thought of as a debugging tool. If a system S must satisfy property P but we can prove that it does not, then S has bugs in it. On the other hand, if S is proved to satisfy P then this is just a con rmation that a certain aspect of S is correct. We can prove properties of software systems at any stage of development. If we do these proofs early in the design stage, we can prevent errors from propagating to later development stages and therefore save time, money, and human e ort. The traditional approach to proving properties of software systems is theorem proving. This approach has several pragmatic drawbacks. The size of the programs that we can prove correct is not very large. Theorem proving must be done by highly skilled experts in the eld. Our approach to proving properties of software systems is model checking, which consists of proving the property by automatically checking every state in the system. Model checking is a technique successfully used in hardware veri cation. The model checking tool we use is SMV, which takes as input a nite state machine (FSM) and a property P expressed in Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and outputs true if the FSM satis es P or false otherwise. If the outcome is false then SMV also outputs a counterexample. Because software systems are not, in general, nite state machines, model checking seems to be inadequate at rst glance. However, we can overcome this problem by abstracting the system and checking a nite model of it. We use this method to check cache coherence protocols for distributed systems. The protocols we use are those of the Andrew File System and the Coda File System. We check a cache coherence invariant on the speci cations of these protocols, which are natural abstractions of the systems. We perform other abstractions to reduce the size of the systems to manageable nite state machines. SMV checked our cache coherence invariant successfully and indicated that the protocol speci cations satisfy this property. For our most complicated protocol, SMV took less than 1 second to check a nite state machine with over 43,600 reachable states.
Introduction
Software systems are becoming more and more complex and debugging them is a major problem. Proving properties of software systems can be thought of as a debugging tool. If a system S must satisfy property P but we can prove that it does not, then S has bugs in it. On the other hand, if S is proved to satisfy P then this is just a con rmation that a certain aspect of S is correct.
We can prove properties of software systems at any stage of development. If we do these proofs early in the design stage, we can prevent errors from propagating to later development stages and therefore save time, money and human e ort.
The traditional approach to proving properties of software systems is theorem proving. Software systems are, in general, in nite state machines and theorem proving is appropriate because we rely on induction to prove properties in an in nite domain. However, this approach has pragmatic disadvantages. The size of programs about which we can prove properties is not very large. Theorem proving must be done by highly skilled experts in the eld and it usually takes a considerable amount of time.
Our approach to proving properties of software systems is model checking, which consists of proving the property by automatically checking every state in the system. Model checking is a technique successfully used in hardware veri cation. Recent technology advances, like the use of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD), have allowed considerable improvements in this domain. Model checkers can now verify systems with over 10 20 states. Examples of recent case studies in the hardware domain are the veri cation of aspects of the Encore Gigamax multiprocessor 7] and the IEEE Futurebus+ Standard 2] . In both of these case studies the authors discovered signi cant bugs in the systems.
We use McMillan's model checking tool SMV 6] which takes as input a nite state machine (FSM) and a property P expressed in Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and outputs true if the FSM satis es P or false otherwise. If the outcome is false then SMV also outputs a counterexample which allows users to understand why the system does not satisfy the property.
Because software systems are not, in general, nite state machines, model checking seems to be inadequate at rst glance. However, we can overcome this problem by abstracting the system and checking a nite model of it.
In this paper, we consider model checking cache coherence protocols for two distributed le systems, the Andrew File System (AFS) and the Coda File System. Mummert, Wing and Satyanarayanan derived abstract models of these protocols 9]. They also speci ed a cache coherence invariant (CC).
Our goal is to check whether these models satisfy CC, using SMV. For this goal, we perform certain application-speci c abstractions to reduce the size of the corresponding SMV input programs.
We consider four models AFS0, AFS1, AFS2 and Coda+. AFS0 is a simple model on which all the others are based. Models for AFS1 and AFS2 were de ned by Mummert et al. 9] . Coda+ is the version of the cache coherence protocol for Coda developed by Mummert and Satyanarayanan 8] .
1 Section 2 presents these models and CC. Section 3 describes the SMV input language by giving a simple example. Section 4 presents details of the veri cation of the four models. Section 5 is a discussion of the abstractions we performed and the general method we used to transform models into SMV programs. Finally, Section 6 is an overview of related work and Section 7 is a summary of our conclusions.
Cache Coherence Protocols for Distributed Systems
When connectivity and bandwidth are low in a distributed system, caching of data by clients plays an important role. Caching is also helpful when temporary failures occur. A problem arises when there are several copies of a le in a system. If a client updates its own copy then all other copies of that le become invalid. The goal of cache coherence protocols is to address this problem.
A cache coherence protocol speci es the behavior of clients and servers in a distributed system. Servers are the authority on les that may be cached by clients. Clients and servers communicate by sending messages to each other. Clients can only send messages to servers. These messages contain les or information about les, like their validity. A run of the protocol is an exchange of messages between clients and servers. Validity is determined using recency. The most recent version of a le is valid, all other versions are invalid. Recency is determined by a timestamp.
In the models of cache coherence protocols we consider, there is only one server, one client and one le 9]. There is no global knowledge about the validity of the le. However, the client and the server have beliefs about its validity. They also have beliefs about the presence of the le in the client's cache. Before each run, the client has no belief about the validity of its le (if it has one), and the server has no belief about the validity of the client's le. During a run, the client and server exchange messages and change their beliefs. The details of the four models are further described in Section 4, including a description of how the runs end.
The CC invariant property de ned by Mummert, Wing and Satyanarayanan is \If a client believes that a cached le is valid, then the server also believes that the client's le is valid."
Symbolic Model Checking
In this section, we present a simple example to illustrate the SMV input language. Consider the program presented in Figure 1 . Assume that ?5 n 5. In CTL, A means for all paths and F means in some future state along a path. So the formula expresses that along all paths, in some future state, the variable finish will be set to 1. The corresponding SMV input program is shown in Figure 3 . One line 1, we declare the module main. Each SMV input program must have a module named main. The symbol --is used for comments. The variable n is declared to be an integer ranging from -5 to 5. finish is a boolean state variable used to detect termination of the program.
The ASSIGN construct is used to de ne the initial values of the state variables as well as their next values. Thus the ASSIGN statement declares the state transitions of the system. On line 6, the initial value of n is set to 3. The next value of n is de ned using a case statement. In each line of a case statement if the expression to the left of the colon is true then the whole statement gets the value of the expression to the right of the colon. If none of the lines contains a true condition then the statement gets the value to the right of 1 as shown on line 10. In this example, the next value of n is n -1, if n is currently greater than -5, otherwise n retains its value. The next value of finish is also expressed using a case statement. If (n = 0) then we know that the loop must terminate and finish is set to 1, corresponding to finish = true. Finally the SPEC declaration (line 18) is used to declare, in CTL, the property to be checked by SMV. Figure 4 shows the output of SMV for this example. It indicates that our nite state machine Figure 3 : SMV input example satis es the termination property, con rming the expected result that the program terminates with an initial value of 3. SMV also outputs some other information about the run. In particular, the user time is 0.1 seconds for this example and the number of reachable states is 9.
If we change the initial value of n to -3, SMV indicates that the termination property does not hold, as expected. The output shown in Figure 5 also demonstrates a counterexample. SMV prints counterexamples by showing the values of the state variables in successive states, starting with an initial state. For this example, in the initial state (indicated by state 1.1), the value of n is -3 and the value of finish is 0. In the next states, the value of n decreases to -4 and then to -5. At state 1.3, SMV indicates that the system has reached a state it has encountered before, by printing the sentence loop starts here. Therefore the value of finish stays at 0 forever and there is no path in which it becomes 1. This proves that the termination property does not hold when the initial value of n is -3.
--specification AF finish is true 
Distributed File System Examples
The following sections describe the four examples that we have checked using SMV. In each case, we give the speci cation of the protocol, construct its nite state diagram, and describe the corresponding SMV input and output. In this model, the client simply requests a copy of the le from the server. The server then sends a copy to the client. The server's belief about the le cached by the client ranges over fvalid, noneg. If the server's belief is valid then the server thinks that there is a le in the client's cache and it is valid; none, then the server has no belief about the existence of a le in the client's cache or its validity.
The client's belief ranges over fvalid, nofileg. The client's belief is valid if the client thinks that there is a le in its cache and it is valid; nofile if it believes that there is no le in its cache.
The client and server communicate by sending messages to each other. These messages range over ffetch,valg. The message fetch is sent by the client to the server to request a new copy of the le. The message val is from the server to the client indicating that a copy of the le has been sent.
In AFS0, the client's initial belief is nofile and the server's initial belief is none. The client sends a fetch message to the server. The server then sends a val message to the client. At the end of the run, both the client and the server believe that the le cached by the client is valid.
Note that the actual le is not sent by the server in our model of the protocol. We assume that the le is sent along with the message val. The above CTL formula expresses our cache coherence invariant (CC): If the client believes that its le is valid, then the server also believes that the le cached by the client is valid.
The SMV input program is composed of the modules main, client, and server. The module server takes a parameter input that can be any message coming from the client. The module starts with a VAR declaration that de nes the belief of the server and its output (denoted by out).
out ranges over f0, fetchg and denotes a message that the server sends to the client. The message 0 stands for no message. The module server then declares the state transitions for each state variable using the ASSIGN declaration. The initial value of belief is none. Its next value is valid, if the current value of belief is none and the message fetch is received. The initial value of out is 0, meaning that no message is sent. The next value of out is val, if the current value of belief is none and the message received is fetch. Recall that the server sends the actual copy of the le to the client while sending the message val.
The module client also takes a parameter input that can be any message. The state variables belief and out are declared using again the VAR declaration. The out variable ranges over f0, 
AFS1

Speci cation and State Diagrams for AFS1
In AFS1, the client has two initial states: either it has no le or it has a le but no belief about its validity. If the protocol starts with the client having no le in its cache, then the client may request a copy from the server and the protocol terminates when the le is received by the client.
If the protocol starts with the client having a suspect le (one for which it has no belief), then the client can request a validation from the server. If the le is invalid then the client requests a new copy and the run terminates. Otherwise, the protocol simply terminates.
The client's belief about a le ranges over fnofile,valid, suspectg. Its belief is nofile if the client thinks that there is no le in its cache; valid if it thinks that there is a le in its cache and it is valid; suspect if it thinks that there is a le in its cache but it has no belief about the validity of the le. The server's belief about the le cached by the client ranges over fnone,validg as before. The messages that the client sends to the server range over f 0, fetch, validateg. As with AFS0, the message 0 stands for no message and fetch stands for a fetch request. The message validate is used by the client to validate an existing le in its cache.
The messages that the server sends to the client range over f0, val,invalg. The messages 0 and val have the same meanings as in AFS0; inval is used by the server to indicate to the client that its cached le is not valid. Figure 9 shows the nite state diagrams for AFS1.
SMV Input Program and Output for AFS1
. Figure 10 shows the SMV input program for AFS1. The SMV input program for AFS1 is organized in the same way as the one for AFS0. The modules are main, server, and client. The main module in AFS1 is identical to the one for AFS0. The property we check for AFS1 is our cache coherence invariant CC.
In the module server, the state variables are out, belief and valid-file. The variables out and belief play the same role as before. valid-file is a boolean variable used by the server to decide about the validity of a le cached by the client. The server uses this variable when the client has a suspect le in its cache and requests a validation from the server. In the module server, valid-file is non-deterministically set to 0 or 1. If it is set to 1 then the server thinks that the le is valid. Otherwise the server believes that the le is invalid. The initial belief of the server is none; its nal belief is valid.
In the module client, the state variables are out and belief and play the same role as in AFS0. The client's initial belief is nofile or suspect. If its initial belief is suspect and the client receives a failed validation message, then the client believes its le is invalid. It then sends a fetch message to the server, as indicated in the de nition of the transitions for out. The client's nal belief is valid. Figure 11 shows the output of SMV for AFS1. SMV indicates that the cache coherence invariant is satis ed. The user time is 0.05 s and the number of reachable states is 26.
If we checked the converse of the cache coherence invariant: AG ((Server.belief = valid) ? > (Client.belief = valid)), we would get the output shown in Figure 12 . Intuitively, this new property should be false as illustrated in the following scenario. Initially, the client has no le in its cache and requests a le from the server. The server receives this request, sends a copy to the client and changes its belief to valid. However the client has not received the le yet, so its belief is not valid. This situation is a counterexample for the property above.
The SMV output represented in Figure 12 gives this counterexample. The protocol works as follows. Initially, the clients may have one of two beliefs. A client either believes it has no copy of the le or it has a suspect copy. If the initial belief of a client is that it has no le, it may request a copy from the server. The server then has a callback on that le. If the le is ever updated, the server noti es the client and the client discards its copy.
If the initial belief of a client is that there is a suspect le in its cache, it may request a validation from the server. If the le is valid, then the server has a callback on that le. If the le is invalid the client discards its copy.
If, at any time during a run, a failure occurs in the system, the clients hold their copies of the le suspect and the server discards its beliefs about the validity and the existence of the les cached by the clients. The server's belief about the le cached by Client1 (Client2) is belief1 (belief2). Each of the server's beliefs ranges over fvalid, nocallg. The belief valid has the same meaning as before.
The belief nocall indicates that the server has no callback on the le cached by the client. Each client's belief about the le in its cache ranges over fvalid, suspect,nofileg. These beliefs have the same meaning as in the AFS1 model. Note that a client discards any le that it believes to be invalid. For this reason we have chosen not to represent the belief invalid.
The clients may send the following messages to the server ffetch, validate,updateg. An update message indicates to the server that the le cached by the client has been updated. The server's messages to the clients are the same as before fval,invalg. Figure 13 gives the nite state diagrams for AFS2.
SMV Input Program and Output for AFS2
The cache coherence invariant holds for AFS2 only within certain timing constraints because of transmission delay. Consider the following scenario. Client1 has a valid le in its cache and the server has a callback on that le. Client2 suddenly updates its copy of the le. Then the server immediately believes that the le cached by Client1 is not valid and sends a message to Client1 to If a client believes its le is valid at the present time, then at the instant of time right before an interval of time T in the past, the server must have believed that the copy of the client is valid.
In CTL, there are no operators about the past. So this property must be formulated using its contrapositive. The transmission delay is modeled by the amount of time its takes to go from one state to another. This leads us to the following CTL formula: AG ((Server.belief1 = nocall) ? > AX ((Client1.belief = nofile) j (Client1.belief = suspect)))
In CTL, AX means invariably in the next state. Figure 14 gives the input program for AFS2. The program consists of instances of modules Client1, Client2, Server and Env. The env module represents the environment and causes failures to occur between Client1 and the Server and between Client2 and the Server. It has two state variables, failure1 and failure2. Each one of them can be independently set to 1. Once a variable is set to 1, it remains at that value for the rest of the run.
The module client works exactly in the same way as in AFS1. The only di erence is that in AFS2 a client may also send an update message to the server when it believes its le is valid. The last line in the de nition of out in the client module captures this di erence.
The module server now has two beliefs as noted before, belief1 and belief2. The server in AFS2 works in a similar way to the server module in AFS1. Figure 17 gives the input program for Coda+. The property we check is the same as the one for AFS2. It expresses the contrapositive of our cache coherence invariant and takes into account transmission delay.
SMV Input Program and Output for Coda+
Instances of modules in Coda+ are Server, Client1, Client2 and Env. The module env is identical to the one in AFS2. The server now has four beliefs, about the validity of the les and volume version numbers cached by Client1 and Client2. These beliefs can take the values valid and nocall. Note that again the server does not have an invalid belief.
Each of the clients has two beliefs. One belief is about the validity of the le and ranges over 
Discussion
The di culty in model checking software systems is that software systems are not, in general, nite state machines. To overcome this problem, we abstract systems to make them nite state. In this paper we checked abstract nite models of the cache coherence protocols for the Andrew File System and the Coda le system. However, we also performed other abstractions on these models to reduce the size of the resulting SMV programs even further. Section 5.1 is an overview of these abstractions.
In Section 5.2, we give the general method we used to transform models represented as nite state machines into SMV programs.
Abstractions
In this section, we consider di erent aspects of our models and present the abstractions performed for each aspect. These aspects are the number of clients and servers, beliefs, le validity, transmission of messages and failures. The abstractions described are all application-speci c.
One server, one client, one le
The models we give have one server, at most two clients, one le and one volume version number. However, the actual protocols were designed for an arbitrary number of servers and clients. We appeal to the generalization rule from logic to justify this abstraction since our property is of the form 8x.P(x):
The state variable belief really represents two beliefs, one is about the presence of the le in the client's cache, the other is about its validity. The belief valid means that the le is present in the cache and it is valid; suspect means the le is present but there is no belief about its validity; nofile means there no le in cache and thus no belief about its validity.
We could have represented these two beliefs using two state variables, but using only one simpli es the SMV programs.
File Validity
We abstract from the le by not representing it. We also do not represent the client's cache that holds the le. These are reasonable abstractions because the value of the le is not relevant to our cache coherence invariant. We perform this abstraction having in mind the property to be checked.
We also do not represent the timestamp associated with each le. However the server needs to determine the validity of a le when the client requests a validation for an existing le. The server accomplishes this by using a boolean variable valid-file which is set to 0 or 1 nondeterministically. The computation tree for the system then contains both possibilities (valid or invalid le) and both possibilities are checked by SMV.
Transmission of messages
Modules in SMV can be thought of as hardware modules connected together with wires. We use these connections between the client and the server module to transmit symbolic messages.
We represent transmission delays using the one-step delay, between cycles, inherent in SMV. This abstracts away from an explicit representation of transmission delay. It also abstracts the exact amount of time due to transmission delays. One step stands for any period of time. This abstraction is possible because our cache coherence invariant is not related to the exact amount of time a transmission delay could take.
Failures
We abstract from all types of failures that can occur in a distributed system by having only two variables failure1 and failure2 (AFS2 and Coda+). If any of these variables is set to 1, that indicates a failure of any type between the server and the corresponding client. 24
General Method
The abstractions mentioned above allow us to reduce the size of our models. In this section, we present the general method we used to transform these models into SMV programs.
Decomposing the System
The rst step in transforming a model into an SMV program is to decompose the system into convenient subsystems. If we did no decomposition, then we would have to specify the state diagram for the whole system, which could be extremely large. Decomposition allows us to describe the state diagrams for the subsystems only. In our examples, we used a natural structuring based on separating clients and servers into di erent modules and isolating the environment which causes failures into a separate module. This structuring is very similar to decomposition in hardware applications. We can think of clients and servers as hardware modules connected with wires. Although in this application decomposition seems trivial, in more complex systems a more complex decomposition may be needed.
De ning State Diagrams
The second step consists of de ning the state diagrams for each subsystem. This task is accomplished by nding rst the relevant state variables. These may be found using CTL formulae that describe the properties of the system. In fact, the process of de ning formally these properties helps to identify the essential state variables. In our examples, the essential state variable is belief. The task of de ning formally the cache coherence invariant and nding this state variable had been done by Mummert, Wing and Satyanarayanan 9].
SMV modules
Finally, the SMV module system allows us to describe nite state machines. It is helpful to think about SMV modules as hardware structures. In fact, each module can be represented as a Moore machine. In a Moore machine, the state is usually implemented with latches and represents the current values of the state variables. A logic block is used to compute the next values of the state variables. A module in the SMV input language is roughly a speci cation of the logic block for each state variable. The description of the Moore machine for a module represents its nite state diagram.
Related Work
We used application-speci c abstraction mappings to reduce the size of our models. Other approaches to reduce hardware or software systems state spaces consist of exploiting symmetries and using compositional reasoning. The rst subsection describes these approaches.
We use SMV directly to describe our abstract models. Another approach consists of using a speci cation language and mapping that language to the input language of a model checker. The second subsection describes these methods.
6.1. Reducing the State Space
Exploiting Symmetries in the Systems
In the hardware domain, Ip and Dill 4] exploit symmetries to reduce the size of systems. They make symmetries easy to detect by introducing a new data type scalarset, a nite and unordered set, to their description language. They have extended their Mur' veri er to generate reduced state spaces. This method can also reduce in nite domains to nite domains. They call this property data saturation.
In the software domain, Jackson 5 ] exploits symmetry of mathematical relations. He analyzes Z speci cations, based on his relational calculus, using model checking. In his approach, a state that can be shown to be symmetrical to another state, which has been already checked, is guaranteed not to have an error.
For the examples that we considered, we eliminated any form of symmetry by considering only one server, one client and one le. For AFS2 and Coda+ we have two identical clients and this adds a certain amount of symmetry in the models. Indeed, we could have eliminated one of the clients and replaced it with a module that only updates the le. The reason why we kept the two clients is that they came \for free" in the SMV system. The two clients are instances of the same module.
Compositional Reasoning
Compositional reasoning exploits the natural decomposition of a system into simpler components. The components are model checked separately and therefore the veri cation of the system as whole is greatly simpli ed.
In the hardware domain, Grumberg and Long use compositional reasoning and Pnueli's AssumeGuarantee paradigm to implement a veri er system, which they use for the veri cation of a CPU controller 3]. In the Assume-Guarantee style of reasoning, when a component is checked, we assume that the environment behaves in a certain manner. If the other components in the system guarantee this behavior, then the property is satis ed by the system.
In the software domain, Ostro uses compositional reasoning to model check real-time reactive systems. He uses the StateTime toolset and the temporal logic RTTL, to verify compositionally a real-time resource allocation problem 10].
In our approach, we model check highly abstracted models of systems. These models are small enough that they can be handled by SMV directly. Therefore, we check properties about the entire system, without decomposing it. SMV does not support either kind of compositional reasoning.
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Using a Speci cation Language
In the software domain, two approaches in veri cation consists of using a speci cation language to describe software systems and map the speci cations to a model checker's input language.
Jackson 5], as mentioned above, uses a subset of the speci cation language Z, that is based on his relational calculus. Atlee and Gannon verify properties of event-driven systems using the SCR tabular requirements language 1]. They show how to represent any speci cation written in a subset of SCR as a nite state machine. They check an automobile cruise control system and a water-level monitoring system with this approach.
The advantage of using a speci cation language is that the mapping between these speci cations and the model checker's input language is done only once. However, this approach has the disadvantage that the domain of systems that can be veri ed is restricted to the speci cation language's domain. We use model checking directly, therefore our approach is not restricted to a particular software domain.
Conclusion
Model checking is a powerful tool used in hardware veri cation. By using judiciously de ned abstraction mappings, this technique can also be applied to software systems. The critical part of this approach is the process of transforming software systems into nite state machines small enough for model checking. Once these nite abstractions are de ned, transforming them into input in a form required by a tool like SMV, is not a di cult task since a knowledge of how the tool works is not required.
More case studies will allow us to discover other kinds of abstractions and to demonstrate the utility of model checking for verifying software systems in general.
